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ABSTRACT
Email cryptography applications often suffer from major
problems that prevent their widespread implementation. MEG,
or the Mobile Encryption Gateway aims to fix the issues
associated with email encryption by ensuring that encryp-
tion is easy to perform while still maintaining data secu-
rity. MEG performs automatic decryption and encryption
of all emails using PGP. Users do not need to understand
the internal workings of the encryption process to use the
application. MEG is meant to be email-client-agnostic, en-
abling users to employ virtually any email service to send
messages. Encryption actions are performed on the user’s
mobile device, which means their keys and data remain per-
sonal. MEG can also tackle network effect problems by
inviting non-users to join. Most importantly, MEG uses
end-to-end encryption, which ensures that all aspects of the
encrypted information remains private. As a result, we are
hopeful that MEG will finally solve the problem of practical
email encryption.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many previous attempts to make cryptographically se-
cure email applications user friendly and widely available
have failed. For varied reasons, these applications have not
reached widespread adoption. The most common issue asso-
ciated with email encryption lies in the difficulty that novice
users face when trying to effectively encrypt their email, and
even with special training, most average users are not able
to effectively encrypt their emails [21]. Other detractions
from the mass usability of email encryption include the in-
ability to verify the identity of contacts, a lack of end-to-end
encryption, and network effect issues.
To solve these problems we propose the Mobile Encryp-
tion Gateway (MEG); a secure, free, and highly usable al-
ternative to all other previous email encryption technologies.
First, we discuss why previous attempts to encrypt email en-
masse have failed. We then describe how MEG will address
all these deficiencies, including how MEG’s architecture al-
lows for a secure, end-to-end encrypted system that is email-
client-agnostic, enabling users to keep their preferred email
provider by installing an additional plugin for their browser
or email application. We will then show MEG’s performance
does not constitute a barrier to usability. Finally, we discuss
MEG’s usability characteristics and how it enables users to
perform all the necessary actions to securely encrypt mes-
sages without forcing users to understand the encryption
process.
2. BACKGROUND
A majority of the communications that traverse the In-
ternet today are encrypted (HTTPS, iMessage, WhatsApp,
etc.). Encryption helps ensure that our bank records and
store purchases are protected. The basis for one of the
most common types of encryption technology on the Inter-
net dates back to 1976 when Whitfield Diffie and Martin
Hellman proposed public key cryptography. Since then en-
cryption has slowly become ubiquitous in electronic commu-
nications. However, after the 2013 Snowden revelations the
world was shown just how vulnerable their data is to mali-
cious actors. Since then, there has been a flurry of activity
towards encrypting all communications over the Internet [7];
and yet three years later, despite the rise in usage of Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) by companies like Google [12],
most email traffic remains unencrypted end-to-end. The
reasons for this are complex, but often boil down to a lack
of usability of email encryption services and network effects.
The average user does not have the time, money, willingness,
or technical knowledge to fully encrypt their email especially
when free and intuitive services like Gmail and Yahoo email
offer hassle free plain text communications [10]. These is-
sues, in turn, create a feedback loop where network effects
kick in. If one party encrypts their email but the recipient
cannot decrypt the email, then others are less likely to en-
crypt their communications; since if they did their contacts
would not be able to read them [5].
2.1 What is Required?
Throughout the years dozens of applications have been de-
veloped in the attempt to enable widespread email encryp-
tion. To ensure end-to-end encryption of communications
these applications must do the following four things:
• Sign the message with the sender’s private key. This
validates the identity of the sender
• Encrypt the message to ensure only the desired recip-
ients can read it.
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• Verify the original signature from the sender.
• Decrypt the message when received by the recipient so
the message can be read.
Certain encryption methods perform some of these tasks
differently. Signing in PGP works where anyone with a
PGP key can sign anyone else’s key. This validates identity
through a concept called web of trust. In contrast, X.509
certificates are only signed by a Certificate Authority (CA),
and as a result, are trusted based on reputation of the sign-
ing CA.
2.2 S/MIME
The reigning standard for email encryption is Secure/Mul-
tipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME). S/MIME has
the ability to perform end-to-end encryption for email and is
backed by CAs that can validate the identity of the receiver.
The problem with S/MIME is the issue of certificate cre-
ation. Creation of X.509 certificates is a centralized process
imposed by the CAs [11]. Another downside is CAs charge
expense for their services, which is anathema to many users
accustomed to free services like Gmail and Outlook. Even if
a user is willing to go through the cost and effort of obtain-
ing a certificate, network effects must be taken into account.
If an email recipient does not have an S/MIME certificate
themselves, then email cannot be encrypted. To alleviate
this problem, there exist email services such as Ciphermail
that have built-in CAs to automate S/MIME usability is-
sues. However, payment is required for these services to
offset cost of obtaining X.509 certificates [3]. Also, third-
party paid services do not always make their code auditable,
ensuring experts cannot validate their system is end-to-end
encrypted. Corporations often provide the service of supply-
ing S/MIME certificates for their employees, but this only
ensures encryption will occur between members of the same
corporation, and not necessarily with parties outside corpo-
rate boundaries. As a result, average users cannot rely on
corporations or paid services to fix S/MIME’s deficiencies in
accessibility.
Another approach, Key Continuity Management (KCM),
created by Simson Garfinkel, promises to provide automated
generation of self-signing S/MIME certificates [11]. Theoret-
ically, this would mean any user could generate an S/MIME
certificate instantaneously and free of charge. In this man-
ner, KCM could resolve network effects over time. The prob-
lem with KCM is many email providers do not accept self-
signed certificates because they have an inherent security
vulnerability; there is no third party verification of iden-
tity. To fix this, Garfinkel argued that users can determine
whether to trust where the message is coming from, similar
to the way SSH works [10]. However, this approach does
not constitute a feasible solution because the vast majority
of users do not understand the purpose of self-signed cer-
tificates and therefore do not understand the security risks
of using them [6]. When study participants were prompted
with security decisions in a study on HTTPS (deciding whether
or not to accept dubious certificates) users frequently chose
to accept them [2]. Downs findings imply that malicious
users could impersonate a company the user does business
with to get them to accept a self-signed certificate [6]. For
this reason, major email clients do not even accept the use of
self-signed certificates [17]. Furthermore, KCM could place
users at greater security risk for attacks like phishing, given
that they trade built-in spam security filtering for encrypted
email.
2.3 PGP
The main alternative to S/MIME is called Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP). In contrast to generating X.509 certificates,
creating PGP keys is a decentralized process and can be
performed for free in a matter of seconds. PGP is able to
validate identity through a concept named web of trust. In
practical terms, web of trust works through key signing; if
a trusted friend signs the key of another person that they
(presumably) trust, in the web of trust you could logically
trust the identity of the person your friend trusts [22]. As-
suming that a user has properly curated their web of trust,
PGP is just as capable as S/MIME validating the identity
of participants in a communication [9].
Despite the advantages of being decentralized and free,
PGP is notoriously difficult to use. In a famous 1999 study
named Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt, researchers found that
most study participants could not even encrypt their emails
using graphical user interface (GUI) tools for simplifying
PGP actions. The few that were able to encrypt their com-
munications were prone to displaying their private key in
plaintext; defeating the entire purpose of encryption [21]. A
follow-up study in 2006 with improved GUI tools had no
more success with study participants than the original trial
[19]. As a result it is likely that users will continue to ex-
perience difficulties when attempting to manually encrypt
their email.
Paid services like Hushmail are available to automate PGP,
but they too suffer from lack of end-to-end encryption and
have unauditable code [3, 15, 8]. Most importantly, these
services charge money, meaning widespread adoption may
not occur.
Open source email encryption applications using PGP are
also available. One such example is named OpenKeychain.
It is superb in terms of usability and accessibility, but only
Android email clients are supported and OpenKeychain does
not allow use of clients that the user has grown accustomed
to [18]. This is just one such example, and many other
free PGP applications like Enigmail follow the same route
of requiring usage of a specific email client [14].
2.4 MEG
The goal of MEG is to address all the problems associated
with using PGP, S/MIME, and provider-based encryption
schemes. First and foremost MEG will use PGP because it
is free, decentralized, and can validate contact identity via
a web of trust. MEG also aims to alleviate the usability
troubles surrounding PGP by automating the processes of
key generation, signing keys, the encryption, and decryption
of messages for the user. These solutions will enable users
to enjoy the security encryption provides without worrying
about the low-level details of how it works; thereby eliminat-
ing the problems encountered in Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt
[21].
MEG will ensure user data remains private. End-to-end
encryption will be built into MEG as necessary. Meanwhile,
the user’s private key will stay on their phone. Only the
phone’s owner will have the ability to decrypt messages. The
actual encryption of emails will be provided by the MEG
Android app on a mobile device which will serve as the email
gateway. MEG will relay the email over a secure channel
Figure 1: MEG: Message Flow
back to the user’s email client, which can forward the email
to its intended destination.
MEG will automatically handle the process of signing
emails when they are sent with the user’s private key. When
an email is received MEG will verify the message signature
using the sender’s public key. If an email does not have a
valid signature it will not be decrypted.
Finally, to combat the network effects within encryption,
MEG will provide email-based invitations to anyone without
the service. The process will be similar to how social net-
works like Facebook grew in popularity, through electronic
word of mouth [20].
3. ARCHITECTURE
The architecture of the MEG system is what enables it
to be secure, private, and flexible enough to ensure users
can still use their existing email clients. The entire system
consists of three components:
1. A mobile app that performs all PGP related actions
(e.g. key generation, encryption, decryption, and sign-
ing).
2. A email client plugin that sends messages to the phone
for encryption or decryption before they are either sent
to a recipient or read.
3. A server component that acts as a PGP public key-
store, a database for revocation keys, and a message
broker between the client and android device
At the time this paper was prepared, a Thunderbird email
plugin and an Android app were under development for
MEG, with an iPhone app and Gmail plugin planned in
the future.
Upon installing the Android app users are directed to the
installation page, where they input requisite information to
generate both a PGP public/private key pair and a revoca-
tion key. The revocation key is meant to be used if a user
loses their phone or if their password compromised. Activat-
ing this key can ensure that no one else will trust the user’s
public/private key pair in the future.
Figure 2: An Encrypted Message in the email Client
To ensure that communications between the mobile app
and the email client plugin remain secret, we ensure that
all communications between these two components are en-
crypted via an AES-256 symmetric key. Because of the AES
encryption, even if an attacker gained access to the MEG
server component, the user’s communications would remain
encrypted. AES encryption ensures that MEG is encrypted
in transit (i.e. data in motion). PGP encryption ensures
email is encrypted at rest. Combining these two encryption
techniques ensures that MEG employs end-to-end encryp-
tion.
Because mobile devices are frequently networked behind
routing devices or ISP-controlled networks that block in-
coming communications, the server component will assist in
routing messages. The mobile app is engineered to send re-
quests to the server for messages awaiting processing. To
accomplish this, we first send a Google Cloud Messaging
(GCM) notification to the phone from the server to alert it
that a message is awaiting processing. Upon receiving this
notification, the phone will retrieve the message and perform
whatever PGP action it needs to. After processing com-
pletes, the phone will send the message back to the server
for the client app to retrieve. The complete flow of how a
message is transported from the client plugin is illustrated
in Figure 1.
Since all encryption actions are performed on the phone,
email data remains private. The user’s private key is also
stored on the phone. The private key is already protected
by a password, and the proliferation of data encryption on
smart-phones ensures that the user’s private key remains
doubly secure. In case the phone is lost, or if the PGP
key password is compromised, the user can revoke a key
by requesting the server to revoke the key. This will cause
an email to be sent by MEG to the user’s email account
for validating that they actually made the request. This
step ensures that there is a guard against malicious actors
revoking MEG PGP keys.
Figure 3: The Same Message, but Decrypted after
Javascript Injection
The email client plugin is engineered to guarantee that
MEG stores no plaintext data for malicious actors to view.
Emails are stored on Google/Yahoo/Microsoft/etc. servers
in encrypted form, ensuring the email provider does not have
access to its contents. In order to decrypt a message, the
MEG plugin looks for a special header attached to all MEG
emails and then transmits those messages to the phone for
decryption. When the messages arrive back on the client,
the email is decrypted with the AES-256 symmetric key and
then displayed on screen through Javascript injection. This
display is ephemeral and only lasts as long as the user has
the message window open. Figure 2 shows how the user
would initially view their email at rest in the client. Figure 3
shows that exact same message after the Javascript injection
occurs.
4. USABILITY
Our primary aim was to make MEG as usable as possi-
ble to ensure that people with little technical training would
be able to encrypt their email. In the MEG system, there
are two components that users are meant to interact with:
the email client plugin and the mobile app. First, we dis-
cuss how the mobile app’s minimal user interface (UI) makes
performing PGP actions as easy as possible for users. We
also show that the generation of symmetric key information
does not require any technical skill. Finally, we discuss how
the email client plugin enables people to use the same email
services they are familiar with to send encrypted email and
that this plugin requires small amounts of effort to utilize.
4.1 Mobile App Usability
The MEG mobile app is where all PGP encryption, de-
cryption, signing, and key generation actions take place.
Fortunately, users do not need to perform any manual work
to accomplish actions like encrypting data, and as mentioned
earlier, MEG handles all this for us automatically. To de-
crease confusion when using the app, only four different UI
panels are navigable. The app is designed to make generat-
ing a PGP key as simple as possible. Figure 4.1 shows that
only five pieces of information are needed from the user to
generate a PGP public/private key pair: first and last name,
phone number, email, and password. After a user inputs this
information, a PGP public/private key pair is generated.
After generating a public/private key pair the mobile app
needs to scan a QR code to authenticate an email client
plugin. In security-based applications, QR codes have even
been used for physical access control and they can securely
transmit PGP information [16, 4]. The reason this mech-
anism is secure is because a QR code does not need to be
transmitted over a potentially insecure medium like the In-
ternet, and instead, can stay securely with the user. In
MEG, we leverage this feature and use a QR code to trans-
mit AES-256 symmetric key information from the email client
plugin to the mobile app. This symmetric key information
is then used to encrypt communications between the email
plugin and the the phone. The symmetric key is generated
in the email client plugin as shown in Figure 5. After the
QR code is scanned the image is removed from the screen
ensuring that malicious actors cannot gain access to the sym-
metric key information. The main advantages of using a QR
code to transmit symmetric key information are as follows:
(1) it is both secure and easy to use, (2) most users are well
acquainted with using the cameras on their phones; (3) no
additional password input in the email client is required for
decrypting AES-256 encrypted messages returning from the
phone. This ensures that the user only needs to remember
one password when using MEG, the password for the PGP
private key on their phone.
Figure 4: MEG’s Installation Page
Figure 5: A QR Code Ready to be Scanned
One negative aspect of some email encryption applications
is that users must continually input their password each time
they want to send and receive email. This is especially true
of server-based applications because caching a decrypted pri-
vate key would mean that the application could access the
user’s encrypted files and the service is not end-to-end en-
crypted. In MEG, because all encryption actions occur on
the user’s phone, and the phone is in physical possession of
a user, MEG can avoid the user having to re-enter a pass-
word each time an email is encrypted or decrypted. As a
result, MEG can implement in-memory private key caching
on the mobile app. Upon starting the MEG mobile app,
users will need to enter their password to unlock their pri-
vate key. The key is cached and can be reused as long as
the app stays open, ensuring that users can encrypt and de-
crypt their email by having their phone on and MEG open.
If the mobile app is closed by the user or the operating sys-
tem (OS) for some reason then the user will need to log
back into the mobile app. Ultimately, this will be detected
if a user attempts to either send or decrypt an email on the
client. The client will then alert the user that they need to
log back into the mobile app to complete their action.
4.2 Client Usability
While the mobile app performs all PGP actions, the client
plugin is where the majority of user interaction will occur
in MEG. MEG was designed so that users would have to
perform as few actions as possible to encrypt their messages.
Figure 6: Client UI for Sending Unencrypted Mes-
sages
The two main actions a user needs to perform on the email
client are (1) generating a QR code so symmetric key data
can be sent to the phone, and (2) sending encrypted email.
The QR code is generated on the first attempt the user
makes to send a piece of encrypted email. Once scanned,
the QR code is removed from screen and user can begin to
send encrypted email.
Encrypted email is toggled through a check-box at the
top of the email client. Users are always given the option
to leave their email unencrypted in case their recipient is
unable to read the encrypted email or in the case that their
mobile device lacks network connectivity. Figure 6 shows the
implementation of the basic Thunderbird UI where a user
can continue to send unencrypted mail with MEG. Figure 7
shows how encrypting an email can be performed by toggling
the encrypt checkbox.
Since existing mechanisms are used for sending email in
the client, learning a new routine for sending an encrypted
email is not necessary. This is a hurdle that the default
encryption mechanism on Thunderbird and some email plu-
gins such as Enigmail introduce [14]. Conversely, MEG only
requires users to toggle a button for their email to be en-
crypted.
Figure 7: Client UI for Sending Encrypted Messages
To tackle network effects associated with encryption, if
User A sends an encrypted email to User B without MEG,
then User A will send an email asking User B to sign up for
MEG services. As stated earlier, this is similar to how so-
cial networks like Facebook and Twitter became so popular,
through electronic word of mouth [20]. This approach will
help alleviate the network effect problems associated with
encrypted email.
5. PERFORMANCE
MEG utilizes three separate components, in serial fashion,
to encrypt and decrypt messages. So it would be reasonable
to assume that performance of this system could be burden-
some to a user. However, after thorough benchmarking of
the client, server, and mobile application, we believe MEG
imposes no significant speed impediment to the user.
Benchmarking is renown as a difficult process to perform
effectively [13]. One of the key issues is that different ma-
chines may perform differently in benchmarking. So, based
off previously used methodology [1], in Table 1 we show the
environment we ran our benchmarks. A preset email of 300
Component Architecture
Operating
System
Mobile
4 core Krait 400 CPU
2.3GHz 2G RAM
Android 6.0.1
Server
2 core Intel i5 CPU
2.67GHz 8G RAM
Ubuntu 14.04.5
LTS
Client
2 core Intel i5 CPU
2.90GHz 8G RAM
OSX 10.11.5
Table 1: Benchmarking environment
characters was used in each trial. This email did not vary
from trial to trial. It is also important to note the client,
mobile, and server components were located in the same city
at the time of testing. The testing we performed was for the
end to end process of encryption and decryption of emails.
In all trials our timing is recorded in seconds. Since Mozilla
Thunderbird lacks automated performance testing tools we
had to perform our testing in an auto-manual method that
we will discuss in the component testing subsections. Un-
fortunately, this also means it was only feasible to conduct
20 trials each for both encryption and decryption tasks.
5.1 Mobile Benchmarking
In MEG, mobile is the easiest component to test since the
actions performed, encryption and decryption of messages,
are easily isolated in the application’s code. We tested these
processes end to end, from the time the phone receives a
message to the time the phone returns its transformed prod-
uct back to the server. Table 2 shows the number of trials
(n), the median, average (µ), and standard deviation (σ)
of the times recorded in the trials for both decryption and
encryption of emails.
n median (s) µ (s) σ (s)
Decryption 20 0.2865 0.2959 0.032
Encryption 20 0.3155 0.3134 0.042
Table 2: Mobile benchmarking results
5.2 Server Benchmarking
Server benchmarking proved to be a more difficult task
than performance testing our mobile application. The biggest
issue is that the server component uses asynchronous pro-
cesses that are difficult to time. So instead, we found it
best to utilize a network profiler, tcpdump, to gauge tim-
ing. Using tcpdump, we can determine the time from when
the client first sends a new message for processing, to the
point when the server returns the processed message back
to the client. Since this timing also includes the period of
time the mobile application is processing the message, we
subtract the time the phone took from the overall timing.
Doing this, we find the median, average (µ), and standard
deviation (σ) of times a message spent on the server in Table
3.
n median (s) µ (s) σ (s)
Decryption 20 1.33 1.485 0.466
Encryption 20 1.64 1.547 0.373
Table 3: Server benchmarking results
5.3 Client Benchmarking
Performing a thorough benchmark on the client was not
possible due to the lack of performance benchmarking tools
for Mozilla Thunderbird. It was however, possible to per-
form benchmarks for small components of code that can
in turn, give us a view of the total amount of time neces-
sary to perform encryption actions with MEG. Namely, from
Figure 1 we note that there are two parts where the client
needs to interact with the server. These are: sending an
AES encrypted message to the server and then polling the
server for the processed message. In benchmarking both of
these processes we can determine the amount of time, non-
overlapping with the server, that it takes to perform actions
on the Thunderbird client. To be as thorough as possible,
we also benchmark the time used on AES encryption and
decryption.
Task n median (s) µ (s) σ (s)
Decryption AES 20 0.006 0.007 0.0037
total 20 0.168 0.182 0.0398
Encryption AES 20 0.004 0.004 0.0003
total 20 0.088 0.209 0.1755
Table 4: Client benchmarking results
5.4 Aggregate Timing
If we tally the total amount of time that occurred in all
trials for both encryption and decryption of messages we can
find the median, average (µ), and standard deviation (σ) of
the total time MEG used to process a message. As we can
n median (s) µ (s) σ (s)
Decryption 20 1.808 1.962 0.462
Encryption 20 2.098 2.07 0.374
Table 5: Aggregated benchmarking results
see from Table 5, on average, any kind of message processing
takes about 2 seconds to perform. We do not believe that
users will be frustrated by this timing, however, usability
studies are necessary to definitively prove this point.
6. FUTUREWORK
We have described how MEG is a secure and accessible
application for encrypting emails. Future research efforts
should focus on making the software as usable as possible.
The requirement to scan a QR code may be onerous for some
users; and there may be other routes to transfer symmetric
key information, so this question is worth investigation. It
has also been suggested that IPv6 would enable us to elim-
inate the server altogether as a message router allowing the
client plugin to directly communicate with the phone. This
also deserves further investigation.
Currently, MEG is in a proof-of-concept stage and we hope
to make it accessible to as many people as possible in the
future. To improve on accessibility we wish to conduct us-
ability studies to alleviate any UI and user experience (UX)
issues in MEG. One of the biggest remaining items is to cre-
ate a colorized system for PGP web of trust to allow users to
quickly validate their communications and to reduce any lin-
gering confusion about the purpose of web of trust. The per-
formance analysis shows that the slowest component of our
system is the server. Reducing the number network calls and
performing caching of commonly used, non-sensitive items
like PGP public keys could help reduce this time. Additional
work will consist of hardening the system against errors that
may occur from network instability or user error. We also
hope to add an iOS app and a Gmail client to widen MEG’s
potential user base.
7. CONCLUSION
MEG is a free, email client agnostic, encryption appli-
cation that automates all the manual steps of PGP email
encryption. MEG ensures that users do not have to worry
about the details of securing their messages, making it both
more secure and more accessible than other email encryp-
tion schemes. MEG developers have the benefit of learning
from its predecessor applications. We have the ability to un-
derstand where previous schemes such as KCM failed. We
also have the benefit of being able to use the ubiquity of
smartphones to serve as email gateways. Network effects
that prevent ubiquitous encryption can be resolved by en-
suring that MEG is as usable as possible. We believe that
users should not have to choose between security and usabil-
ity. It is, for the average user, a matter of engineering the
correct solution. We believe MEG is the best solution for
email encryption.
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